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3000 Two Logan Square
Eighteenth and Arch Streets
Philadelphia, PA 19103-2799
215.981.4000
Fax 215.981.4750

Michael E. Baughman
direct dial: 215 981 4964
direct fax: 215 827 5907
baughmanm@pepperlaw.com

January 30, 2019

Via Hand Delivery and Federal eRulemaking Portal
The Honorable Betsy DeVos
Secretary of Education
C/O Brittany Bull
United States Department of Education
U.S. Department of Education
400 Maryland Ave. SW, Room 6E310
Washington, DC 20202
Re:

Comments on Proposed Title IX Regulations

Dear Secretary DeVos:
Our Firm writes to comment on the Department of Education’s (the
“Department”) Notice of Proposed Rulemaking under Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972 (the “Proposed Regulations”), on behalf of twenty-four private, liberal arts colleges and
universities located throughout the United States: Antioch University, Barnard College, Bryn
Mawr College, Bowdoin College, Carleton College, Colby College, Connecticut College,
Dickinson College, Franklin & Marshall College, Gettysburg College, Hamilton College,
Haverford College, Hobart and William Smith Colleges, Macalester College, Middlebury
College, Mount Holyoke College, Muhlenberg College, Rhode Island School of Design,
Skidmore College, Swarthmore College, Trinity College, Wellesley College, Wesleyan
University, and Williams College (collectively the “Institutions”). We appreciate the effort that
the Department has made to consider a wide range of issues relating to the challenging area of
sexual harassment and assault. We further appreciate that the Department is striving to provide
“clarity, permanence, and prudence [through] regulation properly informed by public
participation in the full rulemaking process” (Preamble, p. 61,464) and trust that comments of
the regulated community – schools, colleges and universities – will be carefully considered.
Several aspects of the Proposed Regulations, such as the flexibility to use informal resolution

Philadelphia
Detroit

Boston
Berwyn

Washington, D.C.
Harrisburg

Orange County
www.pepperlaw.com

Los Angeles
Princeton

New York
Silicon Valley

Pittsburgh
Wilmington

The Honorable Betsy DeVos
Page 2
January 30, 2019
processes in certain cases, are well-thought out and will be very beneficial to the higher
education community. Other aspects of the Proposed Regulations, however, merit reconsideration and/or further work to ensure that they advance Title IX’s goal of educational
environments free from discrimination and harassment – a goal our clients share.
For many years, the Institutions have worked tirelessly to address the complex
problem of sexual assault and sexual harassment among members of their communities. They
have made significant investments of time and resources to develop policies tailored to their
campus communities, hire appropriate staff, and ensure that appropriate support resources are
available to students. Their responses to incidents of sexual harassment are of the utmost
importance to their communities – students, faculty, alumni, and administrators demand that they
get this issue right. With or without federal law, the Institutions will continue to make
addressing sexual harassment in a careful, thorough, and fair way among the highest of their
priorities.
While the statistics vary, there can be no reasonable debate that sexual assault is a
far too prevalent problem throughout our country, including on our campuses. Each of the
Institutions has developed policies, procedures, trainings, and programs to combat sexual
violence, and consistently monitor the effectiveness of those policies and procedures. The core
of the Institutions’ work focuses on providing appropriate support to victims of sexual
harassment and violence, and ensuring accountability for individuals who violate their policies.
Each of the Institutions is also deeply committed to treating every member of our communities
with respect, care, and fairness.
Although each of the Institutions has as a defining goal that their policies and
procedures both address the effects of sexual violence while ensuring fundamental fairness to all
participants, they have developed differing policies to achieve these goals. The model chosen by
each Institution is based on careful consideration of many factors, including what has worked for
them in years of experience, what best fits their individual school’s mission, culture and values,
what is most sensible given the size and the unique organization of their administrations and
programs, and what kinds of sexual harassment cases they each most commonly face, which can
differ significantly in nature, scope, and quantity and in ways that may warrant significantly
differing approaches. Simply because their policies may be different does not, however, mean
that they do not achieve the same goals of consistent, evidence-based results through a careful,
thorough and fair process. Colleges and universities employ experienced and dedicated
professionals who are on the front lines of addressing sexual harassment and violence every day.
These professionals are better positioned than the Department to determine what will and will
not be effective in adjudicating these complex cases.
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Our primary concern with the Proposed Regulations is that the Department seeks
to remove the autonomy of private, independent schools like the Institutions, by seeking to
impose a uniform, “one-size-fits-all” set of procedures for handling all allegations of sexual
violence and sexual harassment, for every school in the United States, regardless of the school’s
size, history, geography, mission, values, or culture. The Department can and should address
situations where recipients of federal funds intentionally discriminate on the basis of sex. But it
is ill-equipped to regulate the many details of student disciplinary proceedings. Rather than
setting forth broad principles, the regulations seek to micro-manage how schools will handle
every aspect of an investigation of sexual harassment, ranging from mandating adversarial crossexamination at a live hearing to dictating when a school must file or dismiss a complaint of
sexual harassment. The Institutions, like every school in the country, will be required to re-write
their policies and procedures to follow the Department’s directives, even if their current policies
have been developed with community input, have worked well, and have achieved reliable
results.
Respectfully, we question whether the minute details of internal student
disciplinary matters are appropriately regulated by the federal Department of Education with a
single, one-size-fits-all set of mandatory procedures. Moreover, from a purely legal perspective,
we question whether the Department has the authority to do so. Title IX forbids colleges and
universities who receive federal funds from engaging in intentional gender discrimination, but it
does not purport to dictate how their disciplinary proceedings should be handled. Indeed, the
Proposed Regulations are contrary to the very Supreme Court cases that the Department claims
to be applying. We also submit that a number of the specific details of the Proposed Regulations
are unnecessary, will have unforeseen consequences, and will cause considerable harm.
We urge the Department to reconsider the Proposed Regulations.
I.

As a Threshold Matter, The Department Has Not Established It Has Authority to
Dictate How Schools Handle Their Internal Disciplinary Proceedings

Proposed § 106.45 purports to set out details as to how every college and
university in the Nation must handle claims of sexual harassment. It requires that separate
individuals investigate the facts from those who decide responsibility. It dictates the precise
wording of certain elements of notices to parties. It sets exact deadlines. It requires a live
hearing. It requires that schools allow direct cross-examination by an advisor, and that schools
provide an advisor to conduct cross-examination if a party does not have one of their own. It
sets forth specific evidence that can and cannot be considered. It dictates that a school must
dismiss a complaint depending on the geography where the misconduct occurred. The list goes
on and on for almost ten pages.
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The Department appears to find its authority to do all of this from the following
proposition contained in § 106.45(a): “A recipient’s treatment of a complainant in response to a
formal complaint of sexual harassment may constitute discrimination on the basis of sex under
Title IX. A recipient’s treatment of the respondent may also constitute discrimination on the
basis of sex under Title IX.” Of course, any action by a recipient of federal funds “may”
constitute discrimination on the basis of sex, but only if an adverse action is taken because of
someone’s gender. See, e.g., Wolfe v. Fayetteville, Ark. Sch. Dist., 648 F.3d 860, 865 (8th Cir.
2011) (“Title IX imposes liability on a school district for discrimination only if the
discrimination is ‘on the basis of sex.’ We glean from this language of the statute a requirement
of underlying intent, and therefore motivation, on the part of the actor to discriminate because of
one’s sex or gender.”); Hyman v. Cornell Univ., 834 F. Supp. 2d 77, 82 (N.D.N.Y. 2011)
(dismissing Title IX claim where “Plaintiff alleged that [the university] ignored her [complaint],
but she did not, as the law requires, allege facts to indicate that [the university] ignored her
because she is a woman.”) (emphasis in original), aff’d, 485 F. App’x 465 (2d Cir. 2012).
If the mere possibility that a recipient of federal funds “may” act with
discriminatory intent were enough to regulate, then the Department could literally regulate every
aspect of a school’s programs, on the theory that some action by the school “may” be
discriminatory in some circumstances. A professor “may” give a student a poor grade because
she is a woman. A club “may” exclude a student because he is a man. An administrator “may”
fire a subordinate because of his sexual identity. The mere possibility of discrimination does not
justify the Department’s imposition of a complex regulatory scheme on a recipient of federal
funds.
The question, instead, is whether the Department has reasonably interpreted Title
IX to require schools to engage in the exhaustive processes set out by the Department in the
Proposed Regulations. It has not. Title IX does not speak in any way on the issue of how a
school must handle an internal complaint to address sexual harassment. In fact, case law
involving claims brought by both complainants and respondents makes very clear that Title IX
does not require schools to do the things the Department is now proposing. First, the
Department’s assertion that a school’s failure to follow the detailed procedures it commands
constitutes “deliberate indifference” under Title IX is contrary to the very two Supreme Court
cases on which the Department claims to rely. Second, it is well-settled that schools do not
violate Title IX by failing to provide the types of “due process” protections the Department
wants to require. Instead, a school violates Title IX only if a flawed process is specifically
undertaken because of a student’s gender.
There is, in sum, no legal basis under Title IX for requiring schools to do what the
Department is now considering requiring them to do.
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A.

The Supreme Court Has Held That Failure to Follow a Particular Disciplinary
Process is Not a Violation of Title IX and That Schools Should Retain
Flexibility In Responding to Allegations of Sexual Harassment

In the commentary to the Proposed Regulations, the Department suggests that the
Proposed Regulations are meant to follow the Supreme Court’s foundational law in this area,
namely Gebser v. Lago Vista Ind. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998) and Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd.
of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999). 1 See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education
Programs or Activities Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, 83 Fed. Reg. 61,462, 61,468
(Nov. 29, 2018) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 106) (noting that “we are persuaded by the policy
rationales relied on by [Gebser and Davis] and believe it’s the best policy approach.”). Section
106.44 of the Proposed Regulations states that the Department will not take action against a
school unless it has actual knowledge of sexual harassment or violence and then responds with
“deliberate indifference” – apparently a reference to the liability standards set out in Gebser and
Davis. Section 106.44(b) then states that a school “must follow procedures consistent with
section 106.45 in response to a formal complaint” and that, if it does so, “the recipient’s response
to the formal complaint is not deliberately indifferent and does not otherwise constitute
discrimination under Title IX.” (emphasis added). In other words, the Proposed Regulations are
premised on the notion that a school’s failure to follow the detailed procedures it has proscribed
– such as missing a deadline by one day or failing to use the exact wording prescribed by the
regulations – constitutes deliberate indifference, and is therefore a violation of Title IX.
While the Institutions agree that Davis and Gebser properly set out their
obligations, the Department’s Proposed Regulations fundamentally misunderstand Gebser and
Davis. “Deliberate indifference” is not a measure of the quality (or quantity) of a school’s
procedures for processing complaints of past acts of sexual harassment. It is an official decision
by a recipient of federal funds not to address known, ongoing harassment, that subsequently
subjects a student to additional harassment. Davis involved claims that a fifth grader had
repeatedly harassed another student over a period of many months, the parents reported the
conduct to the school, but the school did almost nothing about it. Id. at 633-35. The harassment
thus continued unabated. Id. The Supreme Court held that a school does not violate Title IX
simply because harassment occurs in its programs, but only where (1) “the funding recipient acts
with deliberate indifference to known acts of harassment in its programs or activities,” id. at 633;
(2) the school’s deliberate indifference “subjects” the student to sexual harassment, id. at 645;
1

Section 106.45(a) states that “A recipient’s treatment of a complainant in response to a formal complaint
of sexual harassment may constitute discrimination on the basis of sex under title IX.” It is the Gebser and Davis
line of cases that set out when, in practice, that is the case.
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and (3) the harassment caused by the school’s deliberate indifference is “so severe, pervasive,
and objectively offensive that it effectively bars the victim’s access to an educational opportunity
or benefit” provided by the school. Id. at 633. In other words, deliberate indifference is not a
measure of the process a school has in place to address past incidents of sexual harassment, but is
instead an “an official decision by the recipient not to remedy” known, ongoing harassment, such
that the school’s own actions “subject” the student to harassment by allowing it to continue.
Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see Doe v. University of
Kentucky, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8897 at*33-*34 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 18, 2019) (“Whether the
University failed to discipline is not the question before this Court. Instead, in this lawsuit,
[Plaintiff] must turn her focus to whether the University acted ‘clearly unreasonably’ in
attempting to prevent any harassment. This aspect of Doe’s Complaint takes issue with the
University's administrative process rather than its alleged indifference to Plaintiff’s harassment.
The Court agrees that, on the facts before it, complaining about the process rather than the
response to the alleged harassment itself is simply not actionable by Plaintiff under Title IX.”
(emphasis in original)).
Rather than requiring a specific, uniform response to sexual harassment in
educational programs, Davis makes crystal clear that Title IX does not require schools to engage
in any particular action aimed at bringing harassment to a stop, including a disciplinary response:
“We stress that our conclusion here – that recipients may be liable for their deliberate
indifference to known acts of peer sexual harassment – does not mean . . . that administrators
must engage in particular disciplinary action.” Davis, 526 U.S. at 648 (emphasis added). It
emphasized that “courts should refrain from second guessing the disciplinary decisions made by
school administrators” and that “[s]chool administrators will continue to enjoy the flexibility
they require” in responding to student misconduct. Id. Title IX does not require schools to
“remedy” peer harassment through particular methods, nor does it require schools to provide any
particular process or remedy that a student may want. Vance v. Spencer County Pub. Sch. Dist.,
231 F.3d 253, 260 (6th Cir. 2000) (“[v]ictims do not have a right to particular remedial
demands” under Title IX). “On the contrary, [schools] must merely respond to known peer
harassment in a manner that is not clearly unreasonable.” Davis, 526 U.S. at 649.
Thus, under Davis, schools must address a situation, but are not required to
engage in disciplinary action specifically. See, e.g., Rost v. Steamboat Springs RE-2 Sch. Dist.,
511 F.3d 1114, 1123 (10th Cir. 2008) (“Many factors in the record counseled caution in
determining whether discipline was appropriate in this case, and the district’s judgment call not
to pursue discipline was not clearly unreasonable and deliberately indifferent.”). Nor are schools
required to follow any particular procedures in responding to sexual harassment. Indeed, courts
routinely hold that deliberate indifference is not shown simply by pointing out that a school
deviated from its own policy. Sanches v. Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist., 647 F.3d

The Honorable Betsy DeVos
Page 7
January 30, 2019
156, 169 (5th Cir. 2011) (“A district’s ‘failure to comply with [its] regulations . . . does not
establish the requisite . . . deliberate indifference.’” (alteration in original; quoting Gebser, 524
U.S. at 291-92)); Facchetti v. Bridgewater Coll., 175 F. Supp. 3d 627, 638 (W.D. Va. 2016)
(“[A] Title IX defendant’s failure to comply with its own policy does not prove deliberate
indifference, under clear Supreme Court precedent.”); Doe v. Bd. of Educ. of Prince George’s
County, 982 F. Supp. 2d 641, 657 (D. Md. 2013) (“[T]he Supreme Court has held that the failure
to follow sexual harassment grievance procedures does not prove deliberate indifference under
Title IX.”). In fact, in Gebser itself, the Supreme Court held that a school’s failure to have in
place any grievance procedures at all was not deliberate indifference or actionable discrimination
under Title IX. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 291 (holding that a school’s failure to adopt grievance
procedures for resolving sexual harassment claims does not, by itself, constitute discrimination
under Title IX).
Years of case law interpreting Title IX makes clear that schools should have
flexibility and discretion in responding to sexual harassment. If the absence of a grievance
procedure is not deliberate indifference, then it cannot be deliberate indifference – and thus a
violation of Title IX – to use a process without cross-examination, to use one standard or proof
over another, or to use a single investigator model or some other model of adjudication. Courts
have, in fact, regularly found that a school’s use of one procedure over another in a disciplinary
proceeding does not constitute deliberate indifference, nor are particular shortcomings in an
investigation or hearing actionable under Title IX. See, e.g., Oden v. Northern Marianas Coll.,
440 F.3d 1085, 1089 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that college’s nine-month delay in proceedings was
not deliberately indifferent, even if it may have been negligent and in violation of school’s own
policy); Karasek v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. 15-cv-03717-WHO, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
98949, at *45-46 (N.D. Cal. July 28, 2016) (finding allegations that the university failed to
update plaintiff during its investigation and disciplinary process were, at most, “nonactionable
negligence, laziness, or carelessness,” and not deliberate indifference); Preusser v. Taconic Hills
Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 1:10-CV-1347 (MAD/CFH), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7057 (N.D.N.Y. Jan.
17, 2013) (“Upon receipt of a Title IX grievance, a school district is not required to proceed in a
particular manner, even if there are policies in place that would appear to require the initiation of
a formal investigation.”).
Thus, in the context of sexual harassment involving members of a school’s
community, a school violates Title IX only if it has knowledge of sexual harassment and fails to
take some measures reasonably calculated to stop it. See K.C. v. Cty. Schs., 306 F. Supp. 3d 970,
982 (W.D. Ky. 2018) (“in nearly every case discussing deliberate indifference regarding a
school’s response to reports of harassment, abuse, or discrimination, the Sixth Circuit’s focus has
been on whether the school could have or should have done [things] differently in order to bring
the . . . harassment to a stop.” (emphasis and alterations in original)). The Supreme Court has
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flatly rejected the notion that schools must follow a particular set of guidelines in processing
sexual harassment complaints about past behavior. Rather than following Gebser and Davis, the
Proposed Regulations turn those decisions on their heads.
B.

Title IX Does Not Require That Schools Provide “Due Process” to Students in
Disciplinary Proceedings Involving Sexual Harassment, and “Due Process” is
Inapposite for Private Institutions

Each of the Institutions is dedicated to providing fundamental fairness to each
complainant and respondent in every case, consistent with their local state law, as well as
providing a non-discriminatory process for adjudicating complaints of sexual harassment.
Notions of fundamental fairness, however, are quite different from “due process,” a set of
specific, procedural protections used in criminal law and other settings involving deprivation of
rights guaranteed by the state. Private institutions, including the signatories of this letter, are not
arms of the state. See State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615, 620 (1980) (“A private college or
university, however, stands upon a different footing in relationship to the state. Such an
institution is not the creature or instrument of state government.”); M.B. v. McGee, Civil Action
No. 3:16cv334, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44796, at *27 n.20 (E.D. Va. Mar. 24, 2017); Bleiler v.
College of the Holy Cross, Civ. A. No. 11-11541-DJC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127775, at *13
(D. Mass. Aug. 28, 2013); Kelley v. Univ. of Richmond, Civil Action No. 3:06CV203-JRS, 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35925, at *6-7 (E.D. Va. June 2, 2006). There is simply no authority to
transform private institutions into state actors under a statute that is designed to prevent
intentional gender discrimination.
There is no obligation under Title IX to employ any particular form of
disciplinary proceedings, nor does Title IX require cross-examination, live hearings, or any of
the other procedures the Department intends to require. This is, of course, consistent with
decades of case law observing that courts should not re-try a college’s internal disciplinary
matters, and generally establishing the appropriate standard as one of fundamental fairness. See,
e.g., Napolitano v. Princeton Univ. Trustees, 453 A.2d 263, 275 (1982) (“We agree with the trial
judge that he should not have become a super-trier under due process considerations.”); Clayton
v. Trustees of Princeton Univ., 608 F. Supp. 413, 415 (D.N.J. 1985) (“My conclusion in this case
is that Princeton has accorded Mr. Clayton fundamental fairness in convicting him of cheating,
and that is all that the law requires.”); Fellheimer v. Middlebury College, 869 F. Supp. 238, 244
(D. Vt. 1994) (“Thus it is clear that Constitutional due process standards should not be used to
judge the College's compliance with its [policies].”)
Moreover, concepts of “due process” are distinct from Title IX’s prohibition
against intentional discrimination on the basis of sex. In fact, it is well settled, in case law
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involving claims brought by respondents, 2 that Title IX does not require schools to provide a set
of procedures that conform with notions of “due process.” While a school can violate Title IX if
a flawed process or procedure has led to an erroneous outcome, that is so only if the erroneous
outcome was motivated by the student’s sex. Courts have held that their role under Title IX is
“neither to advocate for best practices or policies nor to retry disciplinary proceedings.” Yu v.
Vassar College, 97 F. Supp. 3d 448, 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). Rather, the sole question under Title
IX is whether, when a school disciplines a student “for sexually assaulting a fellow student, it
discriminated against him based on his gender in violation of Title IX.” Id.; see also Doe v.
Colgate Univ. Bd. Of Trustees, — Fed. App’x —, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 1258, at *13 (2d Cir.
Jan. 15, 2019) (“Assuming that his insistence that the sexual encounters were consensual was
sufficient to raise a disputed issue of material fact on the question of misconduct, to resist
summary judgment John Doe must demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether
Colgate’s actions were motivated by gender bias.”). Thus, “[m]ere allegations a flawed
proceeding ‘led to an adverse and erroneous outcome combined with a conclusory allegation of
gender discrimination’ does not satisfy an erroneous outcome claim.” Saravanan v. Drexel
Univ., Civ. A. No. 17-3409, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166940, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 10, 2017)
(quoting Yusuf v. Vassar College, 35 F.3d 709, 715 (2d Cir. 1994)). There must instead be a
causal connection between the flawed process and a student’s gender, such that the school can be
said to have engaged in the action because of the student’s gender. See Colgate, 2019 U.S. App.
LEXIS 1258 at *13; Doe v. Miami Univ., 882 F.3d 579, 593 (6th Cir. 2018).
Thus, failure to have in place certain policies, like cross-examination, live
hearings, or the right to counsel, does not violate Title IX, absent a showing that the school’s
disciplinary actions were motivated by the student’s gender. See, e.g., Gebser, 524 U.S. at 291
(school’s failure to adopt grievance procedures for resolving sexual harassment claims does not
itself constitute discrimination under Title IX); Yusuf, 35 F.3d at 715 (“[A]llegations of a
procedurally or otherwise flawed proceeding that has led to adverse and erroneous outcome
combined with a conclusory allegation of gender discrimination is not sufficient to survive a
motion to dismiss.”); Doe v. Trs. of the Univ. of Pa., 270 F. Supp. 3d 799, 822-23 (E.D. Pa.
2017) (same); Yu, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 462-71 (rejecting arguments that various alleged procedural
flaws in process, including refusal to allow live cross-examination violated Title IX, where there
were no allegations that the actions were motivated by gender bias). 3
2

As to Section 106.45(a)’s statement that “A recipient’s treatment of the respondent may also constitute
discrimination on the basis of sex under Title IX,” this line of cases explains when that is so.
3

In fact, even where a process is written in a way that favors the accuser, rather than the accused, courts
routinely dismiss Title IX claims because victims of sexual assault can be of any gender, and a “victim-centered
approach does not raise an inference of gender bias.” Rossley v. Drake Univ., No. 4:16-cv-00623-RGE, 2018 U.S.
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In the commentary to the Proposed Regulations, the Department relies heavily on
Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575 (6th Cir. 2018), for the proposition that cross-examination and live
hearings should be required in Title IX cases. Baum, however, involved a public university and
that portion of the decision rested entirely on the Due Process Clause to the United States
Constitution. Id. at 581. In discussing the Title IX claim, the court found that the lack of crossexamination might show an erroneous outcome, but went on to hold that the plaintiff must also
show that the University’s actions were motivated by gender bias to prove a Title IX claim – due
process is not an element of a Title IX claim. Id. at 586-87. 4
***
The Department misinterprets Title IX. Title IX does not require schools to
engage in all the detailed processes set out in the Proposed Regulations and/or to require private
institutions to follow novel concepts of “due process” in internal, private student discipline
proceedings. Schools may not discriminate against members of their communities “on the basis
of sex.” But it is not sex discrimination to decide that cross-examination by attorneys is an
unreasonable way to resolve internal student discipline issues. Because the Department lacks the
authority to do what it is proposing, it should reconsider the Proposed Regulations.
II.

As a Matter of Policy, Schools Should Have Flexibility to Decide What Model of
Adjudication Works Best at Their Own Institutions

Setting aside the question of appropriate authority to require extraordinarily
burdensome and costly processes at every institution of higher education in the country,
experience and legal precedent indicate that institutions need flexibility to determine their own
internal procedures in accordance with their missions, cultures, administrative structures, and
other factors that vary from campus to campus. The Institutions – and presumably schools
throughout the Nation – will continue their hard work to create processes that work best for both
Dist. LEXIS 184836, at *58 (D. Iowa Oct. 12, 2018); Doe v. Coll. of Wooster, 243 F. Supp. 3d 875, 886 (N.D. Ohio
2017) (“[d]emonstrating that a university official is biased in favor of the alleged victims of sexual assault claims,
and against alleged perpetrators, is not equivalent of demonstrating bias against male students” (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Sahm v. Miami Univ., 110 F. Supp. 3d 774, 778 (S.D. Oh. 2015) (same); King v. Depauw Univ.,
No. 2:14-cv-70, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117075, 2014 WL 4197507, at *10 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 22, 2014) (same); Haley
v. Virgnia Commonwealth Univ., 948 F. Supp. 573, 579 (E.D. Va. 1996) (stating that “a bias against people accused
of sexual harassment and in favor of victims . . . indicate[s] nothing about gender discrimination”).
4

Baum is also a single decision from the Sixth Circuit, and it is far from clear whether it would be followed
by other courts. See, e.g., Doe v. Princeton Univ., 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4449 at *21 (D.N.J. Jan. 9, 2019)
(questioning whether Third Circuit would follow Baum).
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complainants and respondents in sexual harassment matters. Our communities demand it. We
face the risk of lawsuits if we don’t get cases right. And it is simply the right thing to do by our
students.
But one size does not fit all. Methods that might work well at one institution
might not work well at another. A live hearing might make sense at a large public institution
which has administrators with experience in conducting such hearings. By contrast, a smaller,
rural school might find that, with fewer resources and employees, some other model, such as a
single investigator model, utilizing an outside professional with relevant experience, is the best
fit for them. Moreover, the Proposed Regulations’ inflexible approach and rigid rules will limit
the Institutions’ ability to adjust their policies based on experience in years to come.
By dictating the precise procedures that every school in the country must follow
in investigating and adjudicating Title IX cases, the Department would deprive schools of the
flexibility they need to adopt policies and procedures that fit best for their institution. Under
Title IX and in other contexts, including disciplinary matters and academics, courts have long
recognized that colleges and universities – particularly private ones – are each unique, and their
internal decisions should be subject to considerable deference. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of
Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985) (“When judges are asked to review the substance of a
genuinely academic decision, . . . they should show great respect for the faculty’s professional
judgment.”); Rost, 511 F.3d at 1123 (“[W]e are discouraged from second-guessing school
disciplinary decisions.”); Doe v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Educ., 329 F. Supp. 3d 543, 570 (E.D.
Tenn. 2018) (Title IX “is not an open invitation for courts, which are often unacquainted with the
realities of and constraints on school discipline, to second-guess school actions with the benefit
of hindsight” (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)); Swartley v. Hoffner, 734 A.2d
915, 921 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1999) (“[I]t is not the place of this Court to second-guess academic
decisions and judgments made in colleges and universities.”); Boehm v. Univ. of Penn. Sch. of
Vet. Med., 573 A.2d 575, 579 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (“[C]ourts are more reluctant to interfere in
the disciplinary proceedings of a private college than those of a public college” because “[a]
majority of courts have characterized the relationship between a private college and its students
as contractual in nature. Therefore, students who are being disciplined are entitled only to those
procedural safeguards which the school specifically provides.”). Institutions that handle these
cases every day are simply better positioned than the federal government to decide what works
best for them.
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III.

Specific Concerns with the Procedures in the Proposed Regulations

Putting aside our overall concerns with the Department’s efforts to dictate the
specifics of schools’ internal disciplinary processes, many of the more than 50 specific
requirements are problematic. These ambiguities and practical challenges are further evidence
that it is not wise for the Department to dictate elaborate regulations as to the details of student
disciplinary proceedings, since the only “fix” for problems discovered in implementation will be
a lengthy regulatory process. We highlight below some of our specific concerns.
A.

Mandating that Schools Have Live Hearings with Cross-Examination Will
Likely Increase Complexity, Costs, and Delays, and May Deter Reporting

While cross-examination may be an important element in court proceedings,
colleges and universities are not courts, nor should they be. They are educational institutions
whose primary functions include educating their students and providing a safe and welcoming
environment for their communities. Those found responsible for sexual harassment will not be
sent to jail. The maximum penalty an institution can utilize is to require a student to leave.
Thus, a school disciplinary proceeding is an internal, administrative proceeding that decides only
whether the school’s policies have been violated.
Administrative proceedings can – and, on a daily basis in a variety of contexts, do
– reach reliable results without adversarial cross-examination. In fact, even with respect to
public schools who are subject to the Due Process Clause, as of today, only the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has held that cross-examination is required under
principles of due process. Other Courts of Appeals have held that cross-examination at a student
disciplinary proceeding in state schools is not an essential element of due process. See, e.g.,
Gorman v. University of Rhode Island, 837 F.2d 7, 16 (1st Cir. 1988) (“As for the right to crossexamination, suffice it to state that the right to unlimited cross-examination has not been deemed
an essential requirement of due process in school disciplinary cases.” (citing Winnick v.
Manning, 460 F.2d 545, 549 (2d Cir. 1972); Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150,
159 (5th Cir. 1961)). We are aware of no authority for the proposition that the right to crossexamine witnesses is required at a private institution. See Doe v. Belmont Univ., 334 F. Supp. 3d
877, 894 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 27, 2018) (noting that Baum did not apply to a private school, and
instead the procedures due were those set out in the agreement between the school and the
student).
We are likewise unaware of another context where the federal government has
dictated that a private entity is prohibited from making a decision as to whether its internal
policies have been violated unless it provides a live hearing with cross-examination. For
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example, Title VII also prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex (as well as other
characteristics). While the stakes are high when continued employment is at issue, any employer
is free to fire an employee for sexual harassment based on whatever administrative process it
deems appropriate for adjudicating such claims.
In other contexts, both public and private, auditors, investigators, and regulators
regularly conduct investigations that form the basis for a decision, without adversarial crossexamination. For example, when the Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights
conducts an investigation into violations of Title IX, schools have no right to question witnesses
(or even to know who they are). Presumably, the Department nevertheless believes the
procedures set out in its Case Processing Manual are both fair and producing reliable results.
That numerous private (and even public) entities have for decades conducted
internal administrative proceedings without live hearings or cross-examination belies the notion
that they are essential to obtaining reliable results. To the contrary, fair and reliable outcomes
can be achieved through any number of methods of investigation and adjudication. In non-panel
models, where the investigator gathers the evidence and the investigator or an independent
adjudicator makes a decision, well-trained investigators and adjudicators will test the assertions
of all parties, including asking questions that probe the veracity of each party’s account.
Similarly, for schools that use a hearing model, a well-trained panel or adjudicator will ask the
same type of probing questions that a single investigator would. Many of the Institutions have
procedures in place that allow the parties to submit questions challenging facts and credibility
through means other than live, adversarial cross-examination.
There are numerous practical problems with requiring live cross-examination by
an advisor, which are left unresolved by the Department, leaving colleges and universities to
wade into unknown territory. For example:
•

The Proposed Regulations would require schools to allow attorneys to
conduct cross-examination on behalf of parties. This will most certainly
turn classrooms into courtrooms, increasing the length of proceedings and
the complexity of managing such hearings. And, particularly at smaller
schools like the Institutions, it may be unreasonable to expect college
faculty and administrators to act as judges, controlling the conduct of
professional advocates. Adversarial cross-examination will require the
adjudicator to make real-time evidentiary decisions, including application
of Proposed Section 106.45(b)(3)(vii)’s prohibitions on prior sexual
history. The lack of clear rules as to the scope of cross-examination also
means that lawyers might use lengthy, repetitive and aggressive cross-
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examination to harass witnesses and encourage them to withdraw their
claims. Schools may be forced to hire judges or lawyers to oversee such
proceedings.
•

Section 106.45(b)(3)(vii) states that “[i]f a party does not have an advisor
present at the hearing, the recipient must provide the party an advisor
aligned with that party for to [sic] conduct cross-examination.” What does
it mean to provide an advisor “aligned” with that party? Further, it is
unreasonable to require schools to provide a faculty member or
administrator to conduct cross-examination, like an attorney, at a live
hearing with an attorney on the other side. The Institutions’ staff and
faculty have different professional experiences and few are legally trained.
Moreover, much as a lawyer would be required to do before a trial, these
educators would be required to extensively study the entire record to
prepare for cross-examination. Schools may find these positions nearly
impossible to fill on a volunteer basis and may need to incur new costs.
Moreover, last-minute requests for advisors will undoubtedly cause delays
and re-scheduling.

•

Section 106.45(b)(3)(vii) states that “If a party or witness does not submit
to cross-examination at the hearing, the decision-maker must not rely on
any statement of the party or witness in reaching a determination
regarding responsibility.” (Emphasis added). This creates a rule even
more stringent than the Federal Rules of Evidence, which at least have
numerous hearsay exceptions. Again, we are aware of no other regulation
forbidding a private entity from giving weight to a written statement in an
internal proceeding determining whether internal policies were violated.
The proposed rule would require that every single witness – no matter how
minor the factual point, whether contested or uncontested – must appear at
hearings, making them exponentially longer and more complicated. Must
they appear in person? For an unlimited period of time? Also, what is a
“statement” of the party? Does the rule mean that written evidence, such
as text messages, may not be considered without the witnesses’
appearance? What if the Respondent confesses in a text message but
decides not to appear? What if a witness with exculpatory evidence
moves across the country, dies, or otherwise becomes unavailable? Such a
binary, restrictive rule will not work well in practice. It is a prime
example of why schools should have flexibility to determine what works
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and does not work based on their years of handling such cases, rather than
having rules dictated to them by the Department of Education.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, adversarial cross-examination will
unnecessarily increase the anxiety of both parties going through the process. For complainants
in particular, this may lead them to simply not come forward or utilize the school’s process, no
matter how meritorious their claims may be. As a result, our campuses will be less safe. Such a
result is fundamentally inconsistent with the goal of Title IX and the Institutions’ goals, which is
to have educational programs and activities that are free from sexual harassment, in all of its
forms.
B.

The Proposed Regulations Should Not Cover Employees

As explained above, while Title VII also prohibits discrimination on the basis of
sex, it does not require the type of detailed disciplinary proceedings set out in the Proposed
Regulations. While a private employer could presumably fire an employee for sexual
harassment after conducting an internal investigation, a college or university receiving federal
funds would be required to first give the employee a live hearing with cross-examination. This
makes no sense whatsoever. Why should private employees in every industry but higher
education be subject to the general rules governing at-will employees, while employees at private
colleges and universities are suddenly vested with certain “due process” rights? Such a result
also makes no allowances for collective bargaining agreements, state law variances, and other
complexities within the legal context for employment. Indeed, the Proposed Regulations create
the risk of conflicts with employers’ obligations under Title VII and state law. The problem is
particularly acute with respect to students who are also employees, creating yet another layer of
intersecting laws and guidance. Schools would likely need to re-write all of their employment
policies which, particularly with respect to faculty policies, could be extremely time consuming
and challenging.
C.

The Proposed Regulations Should Not Require Schools to Dismiss Complaints
Involving Conduct that Occurs Outside of its Programs or Activities or Falls
Outside of the Department’s Precise, Limited Definition of “Sexual
Harassment”

Section 106.45(b)(3) states that if the conduct alleged in a formal complaint
“would not constitute sexual harassment as defined” by the Proposed Regulations or “did not
occur within the recipient’s program or activity, the recipient must dismiss the formal complaint
with regard to that conduct.” (Emphasis added.) At a minimum, the word “must” should be
changed to “may.” Requiring a school to dismiss a complaint involving a sexual assault that
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occurs between two students, because it happened across the street from campus rather than on
campus, is problematic in several respects.
First, there are definitional problems. The definition of “sexual harassment”
includes an evaluation of whether the conduct is “so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive
that it effectively denies a person equal access to the recipient’s educational program or activity.”
As the whole purpose of having an investigation is to decide this issue, it makes little sense to
require schools to dismiss claims at the outset on this basis. Nor is there clear guidance as to
what it means for conduct to occur within an institution’s “programs or activities.” Indeed, the
question has spawned considerable litigation. See, e.g., Feminist Majority Foundation v. Hurley,
2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 35556 (4th Cir. Dec. 19, 2018) (competing majority and dissenting
opinions over whether statements on anonymous social media platform were made in the
school’s programs or activities). How are schools to define this issue in their policies if the
courts cannot? The lack of clear definitions will invite litigation against schools, with allegations
that the school did not dismiss a complaint based on one party’s interpretation of these
definitions.
Second, while the Department seems in the Preamble to intend to permit schools
to handle off-campus conduct or other forms of sexual harassment that do not meet the
Department’s definitions under a separate code of conduct, the proposed regulatory language
uses the mandatory phrasing that schools “must dismiss” such reports. Assuming that in all
cases it is perfectly clear where, when, and how the events occurred is counter to the experience
at many of the Institutions that these issues are often contested and must be determined by the
investigation and adjudication itself. Conceptually, there is no principled reason why a school
should not be permitted to handle these issues under the same set of procedures under which it
handles Title IX matters. Requiring yet another set of policies and procedures for handling
sexual assault complaints depending on their geography will be confusing to our communities,
and is an unnecessary additional administrative burden.
Relatedly, the definition would arguably prevent schools from adjudicating claims
where the victim is not a student (even if the perpetrator is), since non-students generally do not
participate in the school’s educational programs. This creates the risk of incentivizing assailants
to target students who are not members of their own school’s community, which is of particular
concern to single-sex schools whose students might be the target of such activity. Schools
should have the flexibility to take disciplinary action against their students where their conduct –
even if occurring off-campus or involving a victim who is not a student or employee – presents
an ongoing risk to members of its community or is inconsistent with the school’s mission and
values. At many of the Institutions, it is common practice for our students to socialize on other
local campuses. This mandate increases the risk to their students, who are already more
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vulnerable by virtue of being in unfamiliar places. They will be far more appealing as targets for
violence if a perpetrator’s institution would be prevented from pursuing Title IX disciplinary
action for such conduct. It also potentially creates an unprincipled set of distinctions where a
student could be held responsible for a fight in a bar that occurs off-campus, but the school might
not be permitted to hold a student responsible for a sexual assault that occurs off-campus.
D.

The Proposed Regulations Should Not Require Schools to Bring a Formal
Complaint Based Solely on Two Reports of Misconduct

Section 106.44(b)(2) of the Proposed Regulations states that “When a recipient
has actual knowledge regarding reports by multiple complainants of conduct by the same
respondent that could constitute sexual harassment, the Title IX Coordinator must file a formal
complaint.” (Emphasis added). While it may well be appropriate for a school to act on its own
if it has more than one report involving a respondent, the Proposed Regulations improperly
remove the school’s discretion to evaluate each case on its merits. There may be circumstances
where a complainant reports sexual harassment, but is adamant that no action be taken.
Traditionally, schools have weighed that request against the broader interest in campus safety,
and sought to honor the complainant’s request where they can. (Indeed, New York Law requires
colleges and universities to do this. See N.Y. Educ. Law § 129-B). 5 Two reports against one
individual might raise a broader safety issue. But they might not, particularly where one or more
of the prior reports does not relate to sexual assault, or where the individual accused is no longer
a student.
This Proposed Rule is also in tension with the requirement in § 106.45(c)(3)(vii)
that schools disregard statements provided by witnesses or parties at a hearing who do not submit
to cross-examination. If the alleged victims are unwilling to participate in the process, and be
subject to cross-examination, then the adjudicator is not permitted to hear the complainant’s
account. How could the complaint then result in any findings? If any formal complaint filed by
the school is doomed to failure from the start, why should it be required at all?
Schools should have the flexibility to weigh the facts and circumstances of each
case to determine whether independent action by the institution – perhaps against the wishes of
complainants – is required. The Proposed Regulations fail to appreciate that each of these
situations turns on its own facts, is nuanced, and should not be governed by a single set of
inflexible rules for every institution in the United States.
5

It does not appear that the Department has carefully considered how its Proposed Regulations may
conflict with state laws, which will create even more uncertainty and confusion.

The Honorable Betsy DeVos
Page 18
January 30, 2019
E.

The Proposed Regulations Should Not Inflexibly Require Schools to Disclose
All Evidence Obtained During the Course of the Investigation

Section 106.45(c)(viii) would require schools to allow both parties to review all
evidence “that is directly related to the allegations raised in a formal complaint, including
evidence upon which the recipient does not intend to rely in reaching a determination regarding
responsibility.” Investigators sometimes receive highly confidential information during the
course of an investigation, ranging from medical records, to family information, to mental health
counseling notes. They may also receive highly sensitive documents, including photographs or
videos that should not be shared in a way that could lead to misuse. Schools should have
flexibility to redact or withhold such information, at least where it is not sufficiently relevant that
it will be considered by the adjudicator.
Again, the Department is proposing a rule of disclosure that is even broader than
what would happen in a court proceeding. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for
example, parties are entitled to discovery only of information “relevant to any party’s claims.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). And, courts have discretion (as well as enforcement authority) to order
that certain highly confidential, personal or otherwise sensitive information not be disclosed or
be disclosed only subject to certain terms or conditions. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) (allowing court to
limit the scope of discovery to protect a party “from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or
undue burden or expense”). Under the Department’s Proposed Regulations, schools will
apparently have no discretion whatsoever to protect parties from the disclosure of information
that will not even be seen by the adjudicator in the case. This makes no sense.
This provision, along with the provision requiring schools to bring a formal
complaint upon two reports of misconduct, may discourage complainants who seek assistance,
rather than disciplinary action, from coming forward, stymying Title IX’s purpose of ensuring
educational environments free of discrimination. Particularly at smaller schools like the
Institutions, students can feel social pressure not to report misconduct. If students know that
their wish to maintain confidentiality will be overridden if another complainant reports
misconduct involving the same respondent, or if they know that private, potentially embarrassing
information, including medical or mental-health records, will be disclosed, they may be much
less likely to seek the assistance and resources from the school to address the effects of the
incident.
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F.

The Proposed Regulations Should Allow Institutions Flexibility to Choose the
Appropriate Burden of Proof for Their Disciplinary Proceedings

Section 106.45(b)(4)(i) of the Proposed Regulations states that schools can use
either the preponderance of evidence standard or the clear and convincing evidence standard, but
contains important limitations. Specifically a school may use the preponderance of evidence
standard only if (1) it also uses that standard in all other disciplinary matters that have the same
potential maximum penalty; and (2) it uses the same standard for both employees (including
faculty) and students.
Schools should have the flexibility to make their own decisions on the appropriate
burden of proof to use in their internal disciplinary proceedings. The Proposed Regulations
would indirectly regulate the standard of proof schools use in other disciplinary proceedings.
This result does not make sense in practice, nor is it legally appropriate. For example, a school
may have an automatic penalty of expulsion for certain academic misconduct. In such cases, it
may make sense to have a clear and convincing evidence standard for academic misconduct
where the penalty is automatic, but a different standard where the sanction can vary based on the
nature of the conduct. It is both impractical and unwise to dictate that the same standard must be
used for employees, faculty, and students. Employees might be subject to collective bargaining
agreements that require a certain level of proof. Tenured faculty are typically subject to
requirements and protections that have been negotiated over time, through shared governance
processes, and are embodied in faculty codes or handbooks.
G.

The Proposed Regulations Should Allow Schools to Place Reasonable
Restrictions on Disclosure of Information During Investigations

Section 106.45(b)(3)(iii) of the Proposed Regulations states that a school must
“not restrict the ability of either party to discuss the allegations under investigation or to gather
and present relevant evidence.” The Department should not restrict schools from placing
reasonable restrictions on disclosure of information during investigations. During the course of
the investigation, having details of the information under investigation published to social media,
in student newspapers, or other platforms, risks the fairness and integrity of the investigations.
Moreover, many Institutions already wrestle with multiple complaints from participants in the
process about defamation, misrepresentation and retaliation. This is especially so on small
campuses, where students tend to know each other and information spreads far faster than the
institutional investigation will proceed, especially under the Proposed Regulations. Further, the
Proposed Regulations appropriately put the burden on the school to conduct investigations and
prove responsibility; it is therefore unclear why the regulations give the parties unfettered rights
to “gather” relevant evidence, rather than encouraging them to share it with the institution.

The Honorable Betsy DeVos
Page 20
January 30, 2019
H.

The Proposed Regulations Should Not Put Immovable Timelines on Review of
Evidence and the Investigation Report

Section 106.45(b)(3)(viii) & (ix) would require schools to give each party “at least ten
days” to submit a response to evidence used in the investigation and then “at least ten days” to
review the investigative report before a hearing. While parties should be given time to review
the evidence and report, the Department should not mandate the time periods because, again, one
uniform rule does not fit all circumstances schools face in practice. There may well be reasons
to expedite proceedings in certain circumstances. For example, incidents that are reported that
include significant violence or other contributing factors to deem a student “a risk to the campus
community” may result in interim measures being put in place. This may be separation from
another student with a shared class or it may be an interim suspension which separates a student
from the institution for the duration of the conduct process. These interim measures can have
significant impacts on the parties, particularly a Respondent who is separated from the
institution. Schools should have the flexibility to expedite proceedings in a way that allows both
thoroughness and fairness. As with other aspects of the Proposed Regulations, here the
Department is suggesting a rule more rigid than in court proceedings, where courts routinely can
and do expedite hearings where time is of the essence.
I.

Other Issues

We note several other issues the Department should consider if it declines to
revisit and refine the Proposed Regulations:
First, the Proposed Regulations should make clear that a school’s compliance with
the regulations does not violate the Federal Educational Rights and Privacy Act (“FERPA”).
Proposed §106.6(e), which states: “The obligation to comply with this part is not obviated or
alleviated by the FERPA statute or regulations,” does not clearly do this. The Clery Act
Regulations, at 34 C.F.R. § 668.46(l) do, and these regulations should be just as clear.
Second, the Proposed Regulations should make clear that they do not create any
civil liability. As explained above, the Proposed Regulations appear to be based on a
fundamental misunderstanding of Title IX and are inconsistent with well-settled case law. If the
Department chooses to regulate in a way inconsistent with the case law, it should make clear that
it is not intending to create a standard for civil liability.
Third, the Proposed Regulation will require schools to completely re-write their
policies and procedures and set up new systems for adjudicating Title IX cases. It will also
require them to re-train all of those responsible for implementing Title IX on these new policies
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and procedures. This will take time. The regulations should have a lengthy implementation
period – at least eight months – and an effective date of July 1, at the beginning of the academic
year, to allow schools to develop new policies and procedures, conduct training, and education
their communities about the changes.
IV.

Conclusion

We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the Proposed Regulations. The
Department revoked its prior guidance in this area because it had “imposed these regulatory
burdens without affording notice and the opportunity for public comment.”
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-title-ix-201709.pdf. We hope that
the Department will carefully consider our comments about the regulatory burden it is now
imposing, which in many ways is even more onerous than the prior, revoked guidance. If a
lesson was learned from the prior guidance, that lesson should have been that the federal
government is not well-suited to dictating the detailed steps and procedures for all schools to
handle complex, nuanced, internal disciplinary proceedings. We hope that the Department will
learn from experience, and reconsider the wisdom of the regulations it is proposing.
The Institutions stand willing to assist the Department in any way we can.

Respectfully,

Michael E. Baughman
MEB

